A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
zbMATH Open document ID: 0916.90008
author: Tayfun Sönmez
author: Michel Balinski
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1999-01-01T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 1271188
zbMATH Keywords: matching problems
zbMATH Keywords: centralized college admissions
Wikidata QID: Q60174226
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2044838899
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DOI: 10.1006/JETH.1998.2469
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1271188