Supposition as quantification versus supposition as global quantificational effect
This paper follows up a suggestion by Paul Vincent Spade that there were two medieval theories of the modes of personal supposition. The author suggests that the early work by Sherwood and others was a study of quantifiers -- their semantics and the effects of context on inferences that can be made from quantified terms. Later in the hands of Burly and others it changed into a study of ``global quantificational effect''. The difference between these two approaches is illustrated by the fact that the term ``man'' is classified as having distributive (``universal'') supposition in ``Not every man is running'' in the earlier theory, whereas in the later theory that term does not have distributive supposition -- it has determinate (``existential'') supposition. In this paper the author explains these options and argues quoting from several texts that the two theories worked like this. Also the ``doctrine of distribution'' of the 19th century and the ``purposes'' of supposition theory are discussed.
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1281368