On the coalition-proofness of the Pareto frontier of the set of Nash equilibria
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: On the coalition-proofness of the Pareto frontier of the set of Nash equilibria
zbMATH Open document ID: 0918.90143
author: Sang-Seung Yi
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 1999-08-04T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B24
zbMATH DE Number: 1286358
zbMATH Keywords: Pareto efficient frontier
zbMATH Keywords: Nash equilibrium set
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: game.1998.0656
OpenAlex ID: W2138858400
cites work: Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
cites work: Equilibria in a model with partial rivalry
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cites work: Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
cites work: Coalition-proofness and correlation with arbitrary communication possibilities
cites work: Coalition-proof equilibrium
cites work: Finding All n-Firm Cournot Equilibria
cites work: On the Existence of Cournot Equilibrium
DOI: 10.1006/GAME.1998.0656
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1286358