Far-sightedness and the voting paradox
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Far-sightedness and the voting paradox
zbMATH Open document ID: 0919.90148
author: Bhaskar Chakravorti
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1999-05-27T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
zbMATH DE Number: 1292428
zbMATH Keywords: stability set
zbMATH Keywords: consistently far-sighted voting
zbMATH Keywords: voting games
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: jeth.1998.2466
OpenAlex ID: W2065900709
cites work: Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
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DOI: 10.1006/JETH.1998.2466
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1292428