Ambient taxes when polluters have multiple choices
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Ambient taxes when polluters have multiple choices
zbMATH Open document ID: 0926.91052
author: Richard D. Horan
author: James S. Shortle
author: David G. Abler
published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
publication date: 1999-11-29T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B76
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B64
zbMATH DE Number: 1293886
zbMATH Keywords: ambient tax-subsidy schemes
Wikidata QID: Q58392564
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: jeem.1998.1041
OpenAlex ID: W2045037462
DOI: 10.1006/JEEM.1998.1041
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1293886