Dynamic entry deterrence in the UK pathology services market
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Dynamic entry deterrence in the UK pathology services market
zbMATH Open document ID: 0955.90077
DOI: 10.1016/S0377-2217(97)00237-3
author: K. Appert
published in: European Journal of Operational Research
publication date: 2001-02-22T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 90B90
zbMATH DE Number: 1299924
zbMATH Keywords: competition
zbMATH Keywords: decision support systems
zbMATH Keywords: game theory
zbMATH Keywords: health services
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: Optimal capital accumulation and durable goods production
cites work: The chain store paradox
cites work: A Dynamic Model of Entry Deterrence
full work available at URL: s0377-2217(97)00237-3
OpenAlex ID: W1998524277
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1299924