Bargaining with asymmetric information in non-stationary markets
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Bargaining with asymmetric information in non-stationary markets
zbMATH Open document ID: 0957.91041
author: Daniel Trefler
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 1999-06-29T00:00:00Z
review text: In the paper the author imbeds into a market an extensive form game in which an uninformed seller makes all the offers to an informed buyer. Here, the generically unique sequential equilibrium outcome for this game is characterized. This result is used to establish the existence of a market equilibrium and to characterize its generically unique outcome. The impact of market supply and demand on bilateral bargaining outcomes and matching probabilities is explored. Moreover, it is shown how these conclusions can be extended to a large class of extensive-form bargaining games including games with alternating offers, two-sided uncertainty, and outside options. The results are useful for investigation of such questions as why coordination failures and macroeconomics output fluctuations are correlated with real and monetary shocks.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
zbMATH DE Number: 1310139
zbMATH Keywords: matching
zbMATH Keywords: market models
zbMATH Keywords: non-cooperative bargaining
zbMATH Keywords: output fluctuations
reviewed by: A. A. Rakhimov
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s001990050271
OpenAlex ID: W2035584581
DOI: 10.1007/S001990050271
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1310139