Revealed group preferences on non-convex choice problems
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Revealed group preferences on non-convex choice problems
zbMATH Open document ID: 0945.91009
author: Efe A. Ok
author: Lin Zhou
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 2000-10-05T00:00:00Z
review text: The authors investigate choice functions and choice correspondences where the collective choice problem is not necessarily convex. Let \(\Omega^n\) denote the class of compact, comprehensive subsets of \(R^n_+\) with non-empty interior. Then \(S \in \Omega^n\) may not be convex. The authors' first result is that there are no UpperHemiContinuous (UHC) choice functions (i.e., single-valued choice correspondences) on \(\Omega^n\) satisfying Strong Pareto Optimality (SPO). However, lifting the single-valuedness restriction, the authors obtain the following sharp characterization of choice correspondences: A UHC choice correspondence on \(\Omega^n\) satisfies SPO, Arrow's Choice Axiom, and a compromization condition if and only if it is regularly representable (Theorem 2). As an application, the authors characterize Choquet bargaining solutions.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 1310143
zbMATH Keywords: non-convex choice problems
zbMATH Keywords: rational choice
zbMATH Keywords: axiomatic bargaining theory
reviewed by: Duncan J. Melville
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s001990050275
OpenAlex ID: W2065403290
DOI: 10.1007/S001990050275
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1310143