Can pre-arranged matches be avoided in two-sided matching markets?
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Can pre-arranged matches be avoided in two-sided matching markets?
zbMATH Open document ID: 0947.91078
author: Tayfun Sönmez
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1999-09-15T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
zbMATH DE Number: 1310721
zbMATH Keywords: manipulation
zbMATH Keywords: pre-arranged matches
zbMATH Keywords: stable
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2093056254
cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
cites work: Manipulation via Endowments
cites work: The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
cites work: Q3999327
cites work: Manipulating Lindahl equilibrium via endowments
cites work: Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
DOI: 10.1006/JETH.1999.2507
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1310721