On non-Nash equilibria
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: On non-Nash equilibria
zbMATH Open document ID: 0945.91002
author: Mario Gilli
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2000-10-01T00:00:00Z
review text: The author considers a generalization of Nash equilibrium concept, where the players information about oponents behaviour becomes the crucial aspect for the notion of equilibrium, called Conjectural Equilibrium (CE) and Rationalizable Conjectural Equilibrium (RCE). It is a continuation of the article by \textit{A. Rubinstein} and \textit{A. Wolinsky} [Games Econ. Behav. 6, 299-311 (1994; Zbl 0790.90085)]. In this paper the author also argue for a refinement of RCE and show the wide applicability of this approach to the analysis of strategic situation.
reviewed by: Samir Kumar Neogy
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A44
zbMATH DE Number: 1310786
zbMATH Keywords: conjectural equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: rationalizable conjectural equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: strong rationalizable conjectural equilibrium
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: game.1998.0664
OpenAlex ID: W2026594420
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DOI: 10.1006/GAME.1998.0664
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1310786