Communication, computability, and common interest games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Communication, computability, and common interest games
zbMATH Open document ID: 0926.91001
author: Luca Anderlini
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 1999-11-11T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
zbMATH DE Number: 1310885
zbMATH Keywords: common interest games
zbMATH Keywords: computability
zbMATH Keywords: preplay communication
zbMATH Keywords: equilibrium selection
zbMATH Keywords: one-shot two-player finite action
zbMATH Keywords: strategic form common interest games
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2101022853
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DOI: 10.1006/GAME.1998.0652
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1310885