Implementable stable solutions to pure matching problems
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Implementable stable solutions to pure matching problems
zbMATH Open document ID: 0929.91038
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4896(97)00037-1
author: Koichi Tadenuma
author: Manabu Toda
published in: Mathematical Social Sciences
publication date: 1999-08-02T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
zbMATH DE Number: 1319672
zbMATH Keywords: Maskin monotonicity
zbMATH Keywords: stability
zbMATH Keywords: matching
zbMATH Keywords: Nash equilibria
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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Wikidata QID: Q127647245
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1319672