On the logic and role of negative introspection of common belief
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: On the logic and role of negative introspection of common belief
zbMATH Open document ID: 0926.91007
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4896(97)00021-8
author: Giacomo Bonanno
author: Klaus Nehring
published in: Mathematical Social Sciences
publication date: 1999-11-29T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B06
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A40
zbMATH DE Number: 1319686
zbMATH Keywords: negative introspection of common belief
zbMATH Keywords: game-theoretic solution concepts
zbMATH Keywords: correlated equilibrium
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1319686