Repeated games with \(M\)-period bounded memory (pure strategies)
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Repeated games with \(M\)-period bounded memory (pure strategies)
zbMATH Open document ID: 0972.91015
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-4068(97)00061-X
author: Hamid Sabourian
published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics
publication date: 2001-11-19T00:00:00Z
review text: The author formulates and establishes (i) sufficiency conditions for stationary equilibria, (ii) sufficiency conditions for nonstationary \(M\)-memory subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE), and (iii) necessary conditions for \(M\)-memory SPE. In other words, this paper provides a characterization for the set of \(M\)-period memory pure SPE strategies, when the set of actions is finite. The results indicate that the size of SPE set expands very fast as the memory increases, and expands slowly as the action spaces expands.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
zbMATH DE Number: 1330476
zbMATH Keywords: repeated games
zbMATH Keywords: bounded rationality
zbMATH Keywords: memory
reviewed by: K. Chandrasekhara Rao
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: Q5834367
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full work available at URL: s0304-4068(97)00061-x
OpenAlex ID: W2045858173
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1330476