The Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and the probability of electing the Condorcet loser
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: The Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and the probability of electing the Condorcet loser
zbMATH Open document ID: 0953.91006
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-4068(97)00020-7
author: William V. Gehrlein
author: Dominique Lepelley
published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics
publication date: 1999-09-01T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
zbMATH DE Number: 1330488
zbMATH Keywords: Condorcet efficiency
zbMATH Keywords: approval voting
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: Q3323629
cites work: Condorcet's paradox
cites work: Q3125274
cites work: Probabilities of election outcomes for large electorates
cites work: Q3206104
cites work: On the probability of electing the Condorcet loser
cites work: On the relationship of the Condorcet winner and positional voting rules
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1330488