On a private information game without pure strategy equilibria
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: On a private information game without pure strategy equilibria
zbMATH Open document ID: 0960.91004
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-4068(97)00063-3
author: M. Ali Khan
author: Kali P. Rath
author: Yeneng Sun
published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics
publication date: 2001-05-20T00:00:00Z
review text: This paper presents an example of a two-person game of private information in which there is no equilibrium in pure strategies. The example satisfies all the hypotheses of the existence theorems present in the literature on the subject of pure strategy equillbria, except for the fact that the action set of each player is given by the interval \([-1,1]\). As such, it illustrates the limitations that pertain to the purification of equilibria in a standard setting.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
zbMATH DE Number: 1330508
zbMATH Keywords: two-person noncooperative game
zbMATH Keywords: pure strategy equilibria
zbMATH Keywords: private information game
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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full work available at URL: s0304-4068(97)00063-3
OpenAlex ID: W2036501262
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1330508