Existence of optimal auctions in general environments
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Existence of optimal auctions in general environments
zbMATH Open document ID: 0939.91051
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-4068(97)00015-3
author: Frank H. jun. Page
published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics
publication date: 2000-05-10T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
zbMATH DE Number: 1330604
zbMATH Keywords: optimal auctions
zbMATH Keywords: Bayesian incentive compatibility
zbMATH Keywords: relative \(K\)-compactness
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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full work available at URL: s0304-4068(97)00015-3
OpenAlex ID: W2170248597
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1330604