Airport problems and consistent allocation rules.
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Airport problems and consistent allocation rules.
zbMATH Open document ID: 1111.91310
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4896(99)00004-9
author: Peter Schölter
author: Jos Potters
published in: Mathematical Social Sciences
publication date: 1999-09-22T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A80
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 1339478
zbMATH Keywords: Airport problem
zbMATH Keywords: Airport game
zbMATH Keywords: Weighted Shapley value
zbMATH Keywords: Nucleolus
zbMATH Keywords: Modified nucleolus
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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full work available at URL: s0165-4896(99)00004-9
OpenAlex ID: W1985612885
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1339478