Sowing doubt optimally in two-person repeated games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Sowing doubt optimally in two-person repeated games
zbMATH Open document ID: 0952.91013
author: Eitan Israeli
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 1999-12-05T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
zbMATH DE Number: 1348220
zbMATH Keywords: two-person repeated game
zbMATH Keywords: incomplete information
zbMATH Keywords: maximal minimum payoff
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: game.1998.0695
OpenAlex ID: W2037054981
cites work: Q5561633
cites work: Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
cites work: An analog of the minimax theorem for vector payoffs
cites work: Reputation and Commitment in Two-Person Repeated Games Without Discounting
cites work: Reputation in perturbed repeated games
cites work: Nonzero-Sum Two-Person Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
cites work: Q5583591
cites work: Nonzero-sum two-person repeated games with incomplete information and known-own payoffs
cites work: On the Stackelberg strategy in nonzero-sum games
DOI: 10.1006/GAME.1998.0695
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1348220