A note on the Seller's optimal mechanism in bilateral trade with two-sided incomplete information
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A note on the Seller's optimal mechanism in bilateral trade with two-sided incomplete information
zbMATH Open document ID: 0946.91016
author: Okan Yilankaya
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2000-10-25T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 1348019
zbMATH Keywords: bilateral trade problems
zbMATH Keywords: incomplete information
zbMATH Keywords: take-it-or-leave-it
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2116981497
cites work: Bargaining under Incomplete Information
cites work: Equilibria of the sealed-bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information
cites work: The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values
cites work: Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions
cites work: Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
cites work: Efficient trading mechanisms with pre-play communication
cites work: Bilateral trade with the sealed bid k-double auction: Existence and efficiency
cites work: Efficient performance in two agent bargaining
DOI: 10.1006/JETH.1999.2532
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1348019