Belief-based refinements in signalling games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Belief-based refinements in signalling games
zbMATH Open document ID: 0788.90082
author: George J. Mailath
author: Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara
author: Andrew Postlewaite
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1993-12-10T00:00:00Z
review text: There are many economic problems which, when modelled as games of incomplete information, give rise to many sequential equilibria, severely limiting the usefulness of the model. There has recently been a large literature devoted to ``refining'' the set of equilibria in order to reduce this multiplicity by restricting the set of admissible disequilibrium beliefs. This paper argues that the logical foundations of some refinements and the equilibria they focus on are problematic and, further, proposes an alternative refinement, undefeated equilibrium, that avoids the difficulties. We also provide an existence theorem covering a broad class of signalling games often studied in economics.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B44
zbMATH DE Number: 465074
zbMATH Keywords: games of incomplete information
zbMATH Keywords: sequential equilibria
zbMATH Keywords: refinement
zbMATH Keywords: undefeated equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: signalling games
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: jeth.1993.1043
OpenAlex ID: W1998992927
DOI: 10.1006/JETH.1993.1043
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 465074