Evolutionary stability in games of communication
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Evolutionary stability in games of communication
zbMATH Open document ID: 0793.90096
author: Andreas Blume
author: Yong-Gwan Kim
author: Joel Sobel
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 1994-08-16T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: refs4530.pdf
review text: This paper identifies evolutionarily stable outcomes in games in which one player has private information and the other takes a payoff-relevant action. The informed player can communicate at little cost. Outcomes satisfying a set-valued evolutionary stability condition must exist and be efficient in common interest games. When there is a small cost associated with using each message the outcome preferred by the informed player is stable. The paper introduces a nonequilibrium, set-valued stability notion of entry resistant sets. For games with partial common interest, the no-communication outcome is never an element of an entry resistant set.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B44
zbMATH DE Number: 493216
zbMATH Keywords: games of communication
zbMATH Keywords: evolutionarily stable outcomes
zbMATH Keywords: private information
zbMATH Keywords: nonequilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: set-valued stability
zbMATH Keywords: entry resistant sets
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2568391206
DOI: 10.1006/GAME.1993.1031
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 493216