Adjustment processes for exchange economies and noncooperative games
First the author develops two price adjustment processes in which the adjustments depend on both the excess demand and the initial price vector. The advantage of these processes over other ones developed until now is that they converge under far weaker conditions. Besides, they are rather easy to adapt for application to a broader range of models. The author applies the process to an international trade model and to an exchange economy with linear production. In the last chapter the problem of computing Nash equilibria is non- cooperative games with two players and finite strategy sets is treated. The method proposed -- a complementary pivoting algorithm -- finds (under some non-degeneracy assumption) a Nash-equilibrium by solving a stationary point problem in the strategy space. In contrast to other complementary pivoting procedures the choice of the starting vector is free and this procedure has an appealing game-theoretic interpretation. While in general it cannot be assumed that this algorithm finds all equilibria, it can be generalized to solve games with more players.
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 495019