Focal points in pure coordination games: An experimental investigation
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Focal points in pure coordination games: An experimental investigation
zbMATH Open document ID: 0800.90786
DOI: 10.1007/BF01079211
author: Judith Mehta
author: Chris Starmer
author: Robert Sugden
published in: Theory and Decision
publication date: 1994-04-18T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
zbMATH DE Number: 522813
Wikidata QID: Q56687819
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01079211
OpenAlex ID: W2045100013
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 522813