Principals competing for an agent in the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Principals competing for an agent in the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard
zbMATH Open document ID: 0790.90021
author: Gary Biglaiser
author: Claudio Mezzetti
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1994-03-24T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 528880
zbMATH Keywords: adverse selection
zbMATH Keywords: moral hazard
zbMATH Keywords: agent of unknown ability
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: jeth.1993.1071
OpenAlex ID: W1964663511
DOI: 10.1006/JETH.1993.1071
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 528880