A solution to a class of agency problems, with application to the question of limited liability
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A solution to a class of agency problems, with application to the question of limited liability
zbMATH Open document ID: 0800.90267
DOI: 10.1016/0165-1765(93)90036-C
author: Shailendra Raj Mehta
published in: Economics Letters
publication date: 1994-04-12T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 550383
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
cites work: Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information
cites work: Q4108109
cites work: Some inequalities relating to the partial sum of binomial probabilities
full work available at URL: 0165-1765(93)90036-c
OpenAlex ID: W1973971785
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 550383