A new bargaining set of an \(N\)-person game and endogenous coalition formation
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A new bargaining set of an \(N\)-person game and endogenous coalition formation
zbMATH Open document ID: 0807.90143
author: Lin Zhou
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 1995-03-01T00:00:00Z
review text: This paper introduces a new bargaining set that provides answers to the two fundamental questions in cooperative game theory: when a game is played what coalitions will be formed and what payoff vectors will be chosen?
reviewed by: Michel Le Breton
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 569584
zbMATH Keywords: bargaining set
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: game.1994.1030
OpenAlex ID: W2041907395
DOI: 10.1006/GAME.1994.1030
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 569584