Critique of Putnam's quantum logic
This paper concerns Putnam's account of quantum descriptions as contextual interpretations of the underlying quantum structure, and in particular the claim that these descriptions are themselves ``classical'' descriptions, allowing the realist ontology and realist interpretation of measurement, being based as they are on a partial Boolean algebra of truth-value assignments. The author's central argument is that while the notion of measurement ``revealing'' particular real truth-values can be sustained perhaps in the case of single measurements, where a series of measurements is considered the usual issues of ``non-locality'' or ``measurement disturbance'' arises. In particular the case of measuring a single observable repeatedly causes trouble -- e.g. where we suppose the spin of a particle in the \(x\)-direction is first measured, then the spin in the \(y\)-direction, and lastly the \(x\)-direction spin again. The analysis of such measurements ``revealing'' real values within an observable- dependent context is clearly troublesome in that it does not explain why the two \(x\)-measurements do not generally coincide. Lastly, there is some discussion of why arguments in terms of ``weak measurement'' do not resolve the situation. This paper is elegant and easily read by those unfamiliar with Putnam's work. While not in a position to judge how true it is to Putnam's argument, it certainly presents important issues in an elegant way.
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 575485
scientific article