Some refinements of Nash equilibria of large games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Some refinements of Nash equilibria of large games
zbMATH Open document ID: 0854.90149
author: Kali P. Rath
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 1994-08-09T00:00:00Z
review text: Refinements of the Nash equilibrium such as perfect, proper and persistent equilibria for finite player games introduced by R. Selten (1975), R. B. Myerson (1978) and E. Kalai and D. Samet (1984) respectively are defined for large games (i.e. games with a continuum of players and finite actions. It is shown that every large game has a perfect and proper equilibrium. An example of a large game with a unique Nash equilibrium but no persistent equilibrium is given.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A07
zbMATH DE Number: 614098
zbMATH Keywords: perfect equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: continuum of players
zbMATH Keywords: finite actions
zbMATH Keywords: large game
zbMATH Keywords: proper equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: Nash equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: persistent equilibrium
reviewed by: Werner J. A. Stich
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: game.1994.1038
OpenAlex ID: W2002166239
DOI: 10.1006/GAME.1994.1038
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 614098