Nonmanipulable decision mechanisms for economic environments
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Nonmanipulable decision mechanisms for economic environments
zbMATH Open document ID: 0826.90003
DOI: 10.1007/BF00193808
author: Diego Moreno
published in: Social Choice and Welfare
publication date: 1994-08-18T00:00:00Z
review text: Gibbard (1973), Satterthwaite (1975) and, more recently, Barberà and Peleg (1990) have considered the existence of strategy-proof voting schemes for the case that the social alternatives are purely public. The results which these authors obtained were mostly negative. In the present paper, social decision problems are investigated when there are both public alternatives and private goods so that a conflict of interests arises with respect to the latter. Moreover, it is required that decision mechanisms be responsive to the individuals' preferences; these mechanisms need not always select Pareto optimal outcomes. The results of the present paper show that it is not the purely public character of the social alternatives that generated the impossibility results of Gibbard, Satterthwaite and many others. The existence of public components together with opposing interests among individuals yields the same negative conclusions. Two concepts used by the author have to be made more precise before the main results of the paper can be stated. Firstly, a mechanism is said to be responsive if at every preference profile, each person's utility is maximized conditionally, given the outcome assigned to all other individuals. Note that when the set of feasible alternatives is purely public, then every mechanism is vacuously responsive. The second concept is the notion of degree of conflict which provides a measure of the conflict of interests present in a set of alternatives. When the set of feasible alternatives is purely public, the range of a voting scheme contains a degree of conflict equal to its cardinality. If the range consists of just one alternative, there are no conflictive outcomes for the individuals. It is then said that there is a conflict of degree one. The negative result of Theorem 1 presupposes a conflict of degree greater than two. Theorem 1. For two individuals and under the condition that for each person, her set of admissible utility functions comprises all t…
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B28
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B10
zbMATH DE Number: 617485
zbMATH Keywords: strategy-proofness
zbMATH Keywords: public alternatives and private goods
zbMATH Keywords: degree of conflict
zbMATH Keywords: voting scheme
zbMATH Keywords: nonmanipulable responsive mechanism
reviewed by: Wulf Gaertner
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00193808
OpenAlex ID: W2008079262
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 617485