Consistent solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Consistent solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
zbMATH Open document ID: 0864.90008
author: William Thomson
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1994-09-05T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B08
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 633437
zbMATH Keywords: fair division
zbMATH Keywords: infinitely divisible commodity
zbMATH Keywords: consistency
zbMATH Keywords: no-envy solution
zbMATH Keywords: uniform rule
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: jeth.1994.1041
OpenAlex ID: W2088903596
Wikidata QID: Q59972922
DOI: 10.1006/JETH.1994.1041
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 633437