Mechanism design for general screening problems with moral hazard
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Mechanism design for general screening problems with moral hazard
zbMATH Open document ID: 0807.90008
DOI: 10.1007/BF01211443
author: Frank H. jun. Page
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 1995-03-01T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B44
zbMATH DE Number: 695722
zbMATH Keywords: incomplete information monopolist
zbMATH Keywords: moral hazard
zbMATH Keywords: Polish space
zbMATH Keywords: compact metric space
zbMATH Keywords: risk aversion
zbMATH Keywords: optimal screening mechanism
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 695722