Incentives in two-sided matching with random stable mechanisms
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Incentives in two-sided matching with random stable mechanisms
zbMATH Open document ID: 0808.90009
DOI: 10.1007/BF01210572
author: Alvin E. Roth
author: John H. Vande Vate
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 1994-11-27T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A40
zbMATH DE Number: 695757
zbMATH Keywords: random stable mechanism
zbMATH Keywords: stable matchings
zbMATH Keywords: undominated strategies
zbMATH Keywords: subgame perfect equilibria
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
cites work: Q3066116
cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
cites work: Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem
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cites work: The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
cites work: Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem
cites work: The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
cites work: Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences
cites work: Q3999327
cites work: Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01210572
OpenAlex ID: W1974769140
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 695757