Bayesian learning leads to correlated equilibria in normal form games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Bayesian learning leads to correlated equilibria in normal form games
zbMATH Open document ID: 0811.90135
DOI: 10.1007/BF01213814
author: Yaw Nyarko
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 1995-05-01T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91E40
zbMATH DE Number: 695702
zbMATH Keywords: infinitely repeated normal form game
zbMATH Keywords: correlated equilibria
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 695702