Exact implementation
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Exact implementation
zbMATH Open document ID: 0830.90003
author: Dilip Abreu
author: Hitoshi Matsushima
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1994-12-08T00:00:00Z
review text: The basic features of this paper on implementation are the following: first, the social choice functions take their values in a space of lotteries; second, small fines may be levied on players. The solution concept is the iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies. It is shown that any social choice function is implementable in iteratively weakly undominated strategies. The constructed mechanisms have a nice feature. For arbitrary normal form games, the order of removal of weakly dominated strategies matters. In the finite mechanism introduced by the authors, this does not hold.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 700350
zbMATH Keywords: implementation
zbMATH Keywords: iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies
zbMATH Keywords: social choice function
zbMATH Keywords: mechanisms
reviewed by: Maurice Salles
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: jeth.1994.1051
OpenAlex ID: W4244669389
DOI: 10.1006/JETH.1994.1051
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 700350