Equilibrium refinements in sender-receiver games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Equilibrium refinements in sender-receiver games
zbMATH Open document ID: 0820.90130
author: Andreas Blume
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1994-12-08T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B44
zbMATH DE Number: 700353
zbMATH Keywords: effectiveness of perturbation refinements
zbMATH Keywords: sender-receiver games
zbMATH Keywords: babbling equilibria
zbMATH Keywords: pooling equilibria
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: jeth.1994.1054
OpenAlex ID: W3122124571
DOI: 10.1006/JETH.1994.1054
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 700353