Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
zbMATH Open document ID: 0830.90004
DOI: 10.1007/BF01215380
author: José Alcalde
author: Salvador Barberà
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 1995-01-05T00:00:00Z
review text: This paper considers the stability of matching problems (marriages and college admissions) from the strategy-proofness point of view. A first result proves that no strategy-proof mechanism can always choose marriages that are individually rational and Pareto efficient. Then, the authors consider restrictions on the preferences of agents under which strategy-proof and stable mechanisms exist. Such a condition, called top dominance, is provided. The existing mechanisms turn out to be exactly those that were already identified in the literature.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 707354
zbMATH Keywords: stability of matching problems
zbMATH Keywords: strategy-proofness
zbMATH Keywords: top dominance
reviewed by: Maurice Salles
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01215380
OpenAlex ID: W2093267843
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 707354