Optimal principal agent contracts for a class of incentive schemes: A characterization and the rate of approach to efficiency
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Optimal principal agent contracts for a class of incentive schemes: A characterization and the rate of approach to efficiency
zbMATH Open document ID: 0815.90036
DOI: 10.1007/BF01213620
author: P. Dutta
author: Roy Radner
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 1995-06-14T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 707360
zbMATH Keywords: repeated principal-agent situation
zbMATH Keywords: moral hazard
zbMATH Keywords: bankruptcy contracts
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 707360