Moral hazard, renegotiation and debt
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Moral hazard, renegotiation and debt
zbMATH Open document ID: 0815.90008
DOI: 10.1016/0165-1765(94)90005-1
author: Georges Dionne
author: Pascale Viala
published in: Economics Letters
publication date: 1995-06-27T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B28
zbMATH DE Number: 710968
zbMATH Keywords: renegotiation of financial contracts
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0165-1765(94)90005-1
OpenAlex ID: W1986638228
cites work: Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring
cites work: Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem
cites work: Moral Hazard and Verifiability: The Effects of Renegotiation in Agency
cites work: Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
cites work: The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
cites work: Limited liability contracts between principal and agent
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 710968