On the danger of half-truths
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: On the danger of half-truths
zbMATH Open document ID: 0822.03004
DOI: 10.1007/BF01052732
author: Scott Weinstein
author: Daniel N. Osherson
published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic
publication date: 1995-02-22T00:00:00Z
review text: Defeatism is the view that in scientific research it is wiser to seek to elaborate a theory that is only approximately true than to aim for one that is exactly right. This view may look plausible although is not widely held. However, the authors aim to show that at least under some circumstances, defeatism is an obstacle for discovering even approximate truth; the search for approximately true theories may lead to failure. Under such circumstances, the pursuit of exact truth is the surest path to scientific success, even in the approximate sense. To show this, the authors elaborate an idealized model of empirical discovery within which the concepts of exact and approximate success are formally represented. They then show that some kinds of discovery problems can be approximately solved only by scientists who advance theories designed to be entirely accurate. -- The authors emphasize that this is not intended as a decisive argument against defeatism. It remains possible that defeatism is advantageous for maximizing scientific insight across the whole spectrum of discovery problems, or advisable in various specific domains, such as quantum physics.
reviewed by: I.Gullvåg
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 03A05
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 03B30
zbMATH DE Number: 724114
zbMATH Keywords: philosophy of science
zbMATH Keywords: empirical research
zbMATH Keywords: defeatism
zbMATH Keywords: approximate truth
zbMATH Keywords: exact truth
zbMATH Keywords: model of empirical discovery
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01052732
OpenAlex ID: W1974203878
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 724114