The modified Vickrey double auction
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: The modified Vickrey double auction
zbMATH Open document ID: 0996.91054
author: Kiho Yoon
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2001-01-01T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
zbMATH DE Number: 1736557
zbMATH Keywords: double auction
zbMATH Keywords: multilateral bargaining
zbMATH Keywords: efficiency
zbMATH Keywords: dominant strategy
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2028269582
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DOI: 10.1006/JETH.2000.2736
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1736557