A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems
zbMATH Open document ID: 0875.90014
DOI: 10.1016/0165-1765(96)00805-1
author: Sungwhee Shin
author: Sang-Chul Suh
published in: Economics Letters
publication date: 1997-02-27T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 984069
zbMATH Keywords: Matching
zbMATH Keywords: Stable rule
zbMATH Keywords: Strong Nash equilibrium
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0165-1765(96)00805-1
OpenAlex ID: W2061099968
cites work: Implementation under strong equilibrium. A complete characterization
cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
cites work: Stable matchings and rematching-proof equilibria in a two-sided matching market
cites work: Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
cites work: Q3901249
cites work: Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
cites work: Q3999327
cites work: An algorithm for checking strong Nash implementability
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 984069