Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints
zbMATH Open document ID: 0875.90273
DOI: 10.1016/0165-1765(95)00766-0
author: Yeon-Koo Che
author: Ian Gale
published in: Economics Letters
publication date: 1997-02-27T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 984327
zbMATH Keywords: Budget constraints
zbMATH Keywords: First-price sealed-bid auctions
zbMATH Keywords: All-pay auctions
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0165-1765(95)00766-0
OpenAlex ID: W2035239570
cites work: Expected revenue of all-pay and first-price sealed-bid auctions with affiliated signals
cites work: Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
cites work: Optimal Auction Design
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 984327