Impossibility of deception in a conflict among subjects with interdependent preference
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Impossibility of deception in a conflict among subjects with interdependent preference
zbMATH Open document ID: 0907.92034
DOI: 10.1016/S0096-3003(96)00018-5
author: Takehiro Inohara
author: Shingo Takahashi
author: Bunpei Nakano
published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation
publication date: 1997-06-23T00:00:00Z
review text: This paper studies the effect that exchanging strategic information about players' perceptions has on the use of deceit in competitive situations. It is shown that under given conditions such exchanges render pointless strategies that are aimed at deceiving other players about one's true preferences in order to gain an advantage.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91D99
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91F10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A40
zbMATH DE Number: 1006516
zbMATH Keywords: deceit
zbMATH Keywords: information exchange
zbMATH Keywords: voting games
reviewed by: Jonathan Hodgson
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: Solution concepts in hypergames
cites work: On the notion of balance of a signed graph
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1006516