Stability of the core mapping in games with a countable set of players
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Stability of the core mapping in games with a countable set of players
zbMATH Open document ID: 0872.90120
DOI: 10.1007/BF01262511
author: Ezra Einy
author: Benyamin Shitovitz
published in: International Journal of Game Theory
publication date: 1997-10-15T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A07
zbMATH DE Number: 1022685
zbMATH Keywords: dominance relation
zbMATH Keywords: countable set of players
zbMATH Keywords: core of a subgame
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1022685