A property of Nash equilibria in repeated games with incomplete information
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A property of Nash equilibria in repeated games with incomplete information
zbMATH Open document ID: 0873.90130
author: Françoise Forges
author: Enrico Minelli
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 1997-06-10T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
zbMATH DE Number: 1019403
zbMATH Keywords: two-person non-zero-sum infinitely repeated games
zbMATH Keywords: lack of information on one side
zbMATH Keywords: one-shot public communication mechanisms
zbMATH Keywords: Nash equilibrium
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: game.1997.0537
OpenAlex ID: W2117952369
cites work: Bi-convexity and bi-martingales
cites work: Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
cites work: An analog of the minimax theorem for vector payoffs
cites work: Correlated equilibria in a class of repeated games with incomplete information
cites work: Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
cites work: Equilibria with Communication in a Job Market Example
cites work: Q4369412
cites work: Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations
cites work: Nonzero-Sum Two-Person Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
cites work: Q4220390
cites work: Mediated talk
cites work: One-shot public mediated talk
cites work: Q3999542
cites work: Nonzero-sum two-person repeated games with incomplete information and known-own payoffs
cites work: The existence of equilibria in certain games, separation for families of convex functions and a theorem of Borsuk-Ulam type
cites work: Some results on the existence of Nash equilibria for non-zero sum games with incomplete information
cites work: Q4369411
DOI: 10.1006/GAME.1997.0537
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1019403