An optimal auction for complements
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: An optimal auction for complements
zbMATH Open document ID: 0871.90022
author: Jonathan Levin
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 1997-06-10T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 1019404
zbMATH Keywords: optimal selling mechanism
zbMATH Keywords: optimal auction allocation
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W1966404657
cites work: Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing
cites work: Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
cites work: Game theory
cites work: A multiple-object auction with superadditive values
cites work: Allocation Mechanisms and the Design of Auctions
cites work: Simultaneous auctions with synergies
cites work: Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
cites work: Multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design
cites work: Optimal Auction Design
DOI: 10.1006/GAME.1997.0534
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1019404