Common belief of rationality in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Common belief of rationality in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
zbMATH Open document ID: 0872.90127
author: Harborne W. jun. Stuart
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 1997-06-24T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
zbMATH DE Number: 1026050
zbMATH Keywords: finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
zbMATH Keywords: rationality
zbMATH Keywords: common belief
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: game.1997.0549
OpenAlex ID: W2027953754
cites work: Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
cites work: Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality
cites work: Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
cites work: Nash equilibria of finitely repeated games
cites work: Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
cites work: Q4315108
cites work: Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria
cites work: Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty
cites work: Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points
cites work: Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
cites work: Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
cites work: Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox
cites work: Common belief and the theory of games with perfect information
cites work: The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
DOI: 10.1006/GAME.1997.0549
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1026050