Strategic description of social choice
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Strategic description of social choice
zbMATH Open document ID: 0876.90009
author: V. S. Levchenko
published in: Doklady Mathematics
publication date: 1997-12-01T00:00:00Z
review text: I show that by modifying the social choice scheme of Arrow the restrictions of his impossibility theorem can be avoided, although his axioms of universality, independence of irrelevant alternatives and unanimity remain intact. It thus becomes possible to clarify the role of the strategic manipulation effect in the formation of additional restrictions for constructing `democratic' aggregation functions.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 1050631
zbMATH Keywords: democratic aggregation functions
zbMATH Keywords: social choice
zbMATH Keywords: impossibility theorem
zbMATH Keywords: strategic manipulation
MaRDI profile type: Publication
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1050631