Incentive roles and fringe benefits in compensation contracts
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Incentive roles and fringe benefits in compensation contracts
zbMATH Open document ID: 0887.90021
DOI: 10.1007/BF01226934
author: Liang Zou
published in: Journal of Economics
publication date: 1998-05-06T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B38
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 1069855
zbMATH Keywords: fringe benefits
zbMATH Keywords: moral hazard
zbMATH Keywords: risk sharing
zbMATH Keywords: incentives
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1069855